PlatformFramework Mappings
Federation & Compliance
NIST AI RMF
A technical mapping from Chio controls to the NIST AI RMF functions for an operator's self-assessment.
Technical mapping for self-assessment
Four functions
The RMF organizes controls into four functions. Chio contributes to each one differently. At a glance:
| Function | What RMF Expects | Chio Contribution |
|---|---|---|
| Govern | Organizational culture, policies, roles, accountability. | Policy definitions, signed policy hashes embedded in receipts, workload identity attribution, revocation and decommissioning mechanics. |
| Map | Context identification, risk scoping, inventory, control cataloging. | Signed tool manifests, capability-scoped grants, guard catalog, per-invocation receipts with full provenance. |
| Measure | Quantitative risk analysis, tracking, reporting. | Receipt query API, aggregation surfaces, denial rates, guard trigger counts, cost aggregates. |
| Manage | Prioritization, risk response, monitoring, supersession. | Capability revocation, scope reduction, step-up approval, delegation bonds, evidence export for remediation. |
Chio's strongest contribution is to Map and Manage: capabilities, guards, receipts, and revocation are the tool-layer implementation of context identification, control cataloging, and risk response. Govern subcategories are largely organizational; Chio contributes where policy-as-code and workload identity touch organizational artifacts. Measure is partially covered: Chio emits the raw data but leaves risk scoring to the operator's analytics stack.
Coverage Legend
| Level | Meaning |
|---|---|
supports | Chio's shipped controls directly implement the subcategory at the tool-governance layer. |
evidence-for | Chio supplies relevant evidence or partial enforcement; the organization must add procedural work. |
org-owned | Subcategory is organizational or process-level; Chio does not implement it. |
out-of-scope | Subcategory addresses concerns outside Chio's governance boundary (e.g., model training, workforce composition). |
Function: GOVERN
Govern is primarily organizational. Chio aligns with the subcategories that describe signed policies, risk tolerance encoded as configuration, and lifecycle mechanics like decommissioning.
| Subcategory | Requirement | Chio Mapping | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| GOVERN-1.1 | Legal and regulatory requirements for AI are understood and managed. | Capability tokens carry issuer, issued_at, and expires_at; the policy hash appears in every receipt. | evidence-for |
| GOVERN-1.2 | Characteristics of trustworthy AI are integrated into organizational policies. | The guard pipeline enforces fail-closed defaults, and chio-policy defines the policy artifacts those defaults compile from. Which trustworthiness attributes a policy expresses is not labeled inside the artifact. | evidence-for |
| GOVERN-1.3 | Processes defined to determine risk tolerance. | Velocity config plus max_total_cost and max_cost_per_invocation encode tolerance as executable configuration. | evidence-for |
| GOVERN-1.5 | Ongoing monitoring and review are in place. | Receipt store (crates/kernel/chio-kernel/src/receipt_store.rs), checkpoint monitor, and the chio trust serve dashboard. | supports |
| GOVERN-1.6 | Mechanisms to inventory AI systems. | Signed ToolManifest per tool server, WorkloadIdentity metadata per capability. | evidence-for |
| GOVERN-1.7 | Decommissioning processes defined. | Capability revocation runtime, grant expiry, delegation revocation. | supports |
| GOVERN-2.1 | Roles and responsibilities for AI risk are documented. | CapabilityToken.issuer and the delegation chain attribute authority at the protocol layer; human roles live outside Chio. | evidence-for |
| GOVERN-2.2 | Workforce equipped with AI knowledge. | Not applicable at the protocol layer. | org-owned |
| GOVERN-4.1 | Organizational risk culture supports AI risk management. | Fail-closed kernel evaluation, deny receipts on every error path. | evidence-for |
| GOVERN-4.3 | Information sharing across stakeholders. | Signed evidence bundles via the export envelope support portable audit exchange. | evidence-for |
| GOVERN-5.1 | Policies for addressing AI risk exist. | Policy-as-code artifacts compiled from chio-policy; guard configurations and chio.yaml. | supports |
| GOVERN-6.1 | Policies to address third-party AI risk. | Capability scoping restricts which third-party tools are reachable; delegation attenuation prevents authority amplification. | supports |
The time bounds GOVERN-1.1 rests on are the signing body of the capability token itself, so a token that outlives its window fails verification rather than merely reading as stale:
pub struct CapabilityTokenBody {
pub id: String,
pub issuer: PublicKey,
pub subject: PublicKey,
pub scope: ChioScope,
pub issued_at: u64,
pub expires_at: u64,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub delegation_chain: Vec<DelegationLink>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub aggregate_invocation_budget: Option<AggregateInvocationBudget>,
}Signed policy hashes are your audit anchor
Function: MAP
Map uses signed receipts, tool manifests, and capabilities with typed constraints. These records give the organization the context needed to review a tool call later.
| Subcategory | Requirement | Chio Mapping | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAP-1.1 | Intended purposes and context are documented. | Tool manifest descriptions, workload identity metadata on capability tokens. | evidence-for |
| MAP-1.5 | Organizational risk tolerances are determined. | Velocity config, budget caps, GovernedAutonomyTier on capability tokens. | evidence-for |
| MAP-2.1 | Task and method are identified and defined. | Tool definitions within the signed manifest: parameter schema, description, and typed constraints. | supports |
| MAP-2.3 | AI capabilities, targeted usage, and assumptions are documented. | Tool manifests plus AgentPassport (crates/trust/chio-credentials/src/passport.rs), which carries merkle_roots and a set of ReputationCredential entries. Assumptions themselves stay free text. | evidence-for |
| MAP-3.2 | Potential costs are examined. | FinancialReceiptMetadata on receipts whose grant is monetary; budget enforcement inside the kernel. Non-monetary cost types are not modeled. | supports |
| MAP-3.4 | Processes for human-AI configurations are established. | DPoP binds an agent keypair to every invocation; capability subject identifies the responsible agent. | evidence-for |
| MAP-3.5 | Processes for human oversight are defined. | DPoP proofs and GovernedApprovalToken for step-up review at higher autonomy tiers. | supports |
| MAP-4.1 | Approaches for mapping AI risks are identified. | Guard pipeline produces structured verdicts; receipt analytics surfaces aggregates. | evidence-for |
| MAP-4.2 | Internal risk controls are identified and documented. | Named guards: velocity, egress allowlist, secret leak, path allowlist, data-flow, response sanitization, patch integrity. | supports |
| MAP-5.1 | Likelihood and magnitude of each impact are identified. | Raw data available via receipt store; risk scoring layer is operator-owned. | evidence-for |
Function: MEASURE
Measure asks for quantitative tracking of risks, mitigations, and outcomes. Chio emits the raw data: every invocation, every denial, every guard trigger, every cost event is a signed, queryable record. Scoring itself is left to the operator, because scoring requires taxonomy choices that are organization-specific.
| Subcategory | Requirement | Chio Mapping | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| MEASURE-1.1 | Approaches and metrics for measurement are selected. | Receipt query API exposes counts, denial rates, cost aggregates, and guard-trigger frequencies. | evidence-for |
| MEASURE-2.3 | Performance metrics are tracked. | Receipt store records timing, outcome, and cost; SIEM export streams these to downstream analytics. | evidence-for |
| MEASURE-2.4 | Measurement results are documented. | Signed evidence bundles and session compliance certificates. | supports |
| MEASURE-2.5 | Robustness, reliability, resilience are evaluated. | Fail-closed pipeline, checkpoint integrity verification, archival of signed receipts. | evidence-for |
| MEASURE-2.6 | Safety risks are evaluated. | Jailbreak and prompt-injection detectors in the application-layer guard suite, plus secret_leak, egress_allowlist, and forbidden_path in crates/guards/chio-guards/src/. | supports |
| MEASURE-2.7 | Security and resilience are evaluated. | Signed receipts, Merkle checkpoints, DPoP, capability revocation. | supports |
| MEASURE-2.8 | Privacy violation risks are examined. | PII-oriented QueryResultGuard and response_sanitization, plus column constraints on the data guards. Not all privacy patterns are covered. | evidence-for |
| MEASURE-3.2 | Risks are tracked at scale. | Merkle checkpoints enable scalable tamper-evident aggregation; receipt query pagination keeps analytics tractable. | supports |
| MEASURE-4.2 | Risks from deployment environments are evaluated. | Internal network and egress allowlist guards limit environmental reach of governed agents. | evidence-for |
Scoring is the operator's job
Function: MANAGE
Manage covers prioritization, treatment, and post-deployment response. Chio's capability-plus-revocation model is precisely the primitive the Manage function needs at the tool boundary. The prioritization rows draw on chio-underwriting (crates/economy/chio-underwriting/src/lib.rs), which sorts an agent into one of four risk tiers: Baseline, Guarded, Elevated, and Critical, from its receipt, reputation, certification, and settlement evidence, and pairs each tier with typed reason codes.
| Subcategory | Requirement | Chio Mapping | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| MANAGE-1.1 | Purpose and impacts are prioritized. | Underwriting tiering plus GovernedAutonomyTier on capability tokens. | evidence-for |
| MANAGE-1.2 | Treatment of documented risks is prioritized. | Guard pipeline verdicts, deny receipts, scope reduction, grant expiry. | evidence-for |
| MANAGE-1.3 | Responses are developed, planned, documented. | Revocation runtime, scope reduction, approval tokens. | evidence-for |
| MANAGE-2.1 | Resources are allocated to risks. | Budget enforcement through per-grant caps and monetary receipts. | supports |
| MANAGE-2.2 | Mechanisms to supersede, disengage, deactivate AI. | Capability revocation (crates/kernel/chio-kernel/src/revocation_runtime.rs), token expiry, and delegation revocation at any parent in the chain. | supports |
| MANAGE-2.3 | Procedures to respond to risks. | Guard pipeline deny, step-up approval via GovernedApprovalToken, evidence export for downstream investigation. | supports |
| MANAGE-2.4 | Post-use processes and procedures are applied. | Evidence retention (crates/platform/chio-store-sqlite/src/receipt_store/evidence_retention.rs) archives signed receipts past deactivation, and the rotation carries across the checkpoint rows those receipts verify against. | supports |
| MANAGE-3.1 | Resources are allocated to identified AI risks. | FinancialReceiptMetadata tracks monetary allocation on the receipts that carry it. Non-monetary allocation is external. | evidence-for |
| MANAGE-4.1 | Post-deployment AI monitoring is applied. | Receipt stream plus checkpoint integrity checks. | supports |
| MANAGE-4.2 | Actionable feedback about AI risks is captured. | Guard evidence in every receipt, SIEM event stream. | evidence-for |
Evidence Collection Example
A common review question is: "show me the evidence that covers MAP-2.1 and MANAGE-2.2 for the past quarter." Chio gives that as a queryable bundle. A local receipt read carries an explicit boundary: the command refuses rather than defaulting to every tenant.
$ chio --receipt-db ./receipts.db receipt list --outcome denyerror [urn:chio:error:cli:other]: --tenant <id> or --admin-all is required for local receipt reads
context: {"domain":"cli","severity":"error","stability":"deprecated","string_code":"CHIO-CLI-OTHER"}
suggested fix: Preserve the original message and migrate the call site to a specific registry code when touched.With a boundary, the same read surfaces every denial in the window (MANAGE-2.2) as one JSON object per line. The count is two here, a guard refusal and an out-of-scope tool; a revoked or expired capability lands in the same file, because it fails closed as a signed deny receipt too. --outcome takes allow, deny, cancelled, or incomplete, and --since and --until take Unix seconds:
$ chio --receipt-db ./receipts.db receipt list --outcome deny --admin-all \
> q1-denials.jsonl
$ wc -l < q1-denials.jsonl2
Assembling the auditor-facing package (MAP-2.1 and MANAGE-2.2) is one command, and --require-proofs makes it fail rather than ship a package whose receipts are not yet covered by a checkpoint. On a store with no checkpoint, that is exactly what happens, and the refusal names the uncovered receipts:
$ chio --receipt-db ./receipts.db evidence export \
--policy-file ./policy.yaml --admin-all --require-proofs \
--output ./rmf-evidence-proofserror [urn:chio:error:attest:provenance-missing]: evidence export requires checkpoint coverage, but 3 receipt(s) are uncheckpointed: 1bf1899605687b63a64d598e1b5fbad0e329ec304a13fdd128eb4dd03672d5d8@1, 6696bb2340f2f205f87ce289c18292cd64b9efe45ff5f1f3258035c85fd6a216@2, 87af412413cfd8f580b26c7db75bac4c4a155619859ac9ae98d6c5615f1becaf@3
context: {"domain":"attest","severity":"error","stability":"unstable","string_code":"CHIO-ATTEST-PROVENANCE-MISSING"}
suggested fix: Regenerate the evidence bundle and include provenance before submitting the operation.Dropping the proof requirement exports the same window and records the gap in the manifest instead of refusing. The package carries the receipts and child receipts for the window, the capability lineage they reference, the covering Merkle checkpoints, per-receipt inclusion proofs, and the attached policy:
$ chio --receipt-db ./receipts.db evidence export \
--policy-file ./policy.yaml --admin-all --output ./rmf-evidence
$ chio evidence verify --input ./rmf-evidenceevidence package verified tool_receipts: 3 child_receipts: 0 checkpoints: 0 checkpoint_publications: 0 checkpoint_witnesses: 0 checkpoint_consistency_proofs: 0 checkpoint_equivocations: 0 capability_lineage: 3 inclusion_proofs: 0 uncheckpointed_receipts: 3 authorized_receipts: 1 trace_observations: 0 advisory_evaluations: 0 verified_files: 14 child_receipt_scope: FullQueryWindow transparency_preview_logs: 0 publication_state: transparency_preview
An auditor verifies the package offline with chio evidence verify --input, as above, and pulls inclusion proofs for any subset of interest without runtime access to the live kernel. Tool definitions themselves live in signed ToolManifest documents, verified when a tool server is registered; they are not part of the evidence package.
Gaps and Non-Goals
- Risk scoring: Chio emits the raw data for MEASURE, but scoring is operator-owned.
- Residual-risk register: MANAGE-1.4 requires tracking residual risk. Chio does not model residual risk explicitly; operators build that register from receipt aggregates.
- Fairness, bias, environmental impact: MEASURE-2.9 through MEASURE-2.12 concern model-layer properties that a tool-governance layer cannot observe.
- Workforce-related Govern subcategories: roles, training, leadership commitment, and stakeholder culture are organizational and not implementable in code.
Not a certification artifact
Cross-References
- Capabilities for the scoping model referenced in Map and Manage.
- Receipts for the evidence record format used by Measure.
- Guards for the named controls that implement Map-4.2.
- EU AI Act for the parallel mapping against Article 19 logging.